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Abstract 
This study is an experimental investigation of 
bargaining by people of different cultural backgrounds: 
Arab and American. This study is intra-cultural in that 
two kinds of same culture dyads were observed: Arab-Arab 
and American-American. However, this study is also 
inter-cultural; it included comparable instances of 
Arabs bargaining with Americans. For each of the three 
experimental types, the experimental design was the same. 
Each experimental session contained six bargaining 
rounds. In all bargaining sessions, the resources were 
valued in such a way that equity was difficult to 
determine. Thus the mixed-motive qualities of the game 
were emphasized. All sessions were videotaped and 
content analyzed, using a coding system developed by 
Sillars. There were 24 trials, eight for each of the 
three experimental conditions. No results were 
statistically significant. However, Arabs were generally 
more effective bargainers than Americans in the 
inter-cultural condition. Some differences in verbal 
strategies between Arabs and Americans were found. 
However, they were not consistent with the bulk of the 
literature reviewed. Whereas the literature emphasized 
the competitiveness of Arabs in negotiation situations, 
it was found that Arabs were more integrative than 
American subjects in the inter-cultural negotiations. 
While much of the literature in cross-cultural communication 
emphasizes communication barriers which are culturally 
induced, findings of this study are not supportive of 
the generality of that view. 
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This study is an investigation of Arab and 
American subJects in an experimental bargaining situation. 
For the study, a series of experimental tests involving 
dyadic negotiation and exchange were conducted. Three 
kinds of dyads were constructed: the first pairing two 
American subjects, the second two Arab subjects, and the 
third an American and an Arab subJect. The following 
research questions are addressed. Is cultural background 
an important condition in determining the outcome of 
dyadic bargaining? Are different types of verbal 
strategies employed by the two cultural groups during 
negotiation? Is there a connection between the types 
and/or frequency of verbal strategies used by a subject 
and his/her effectiveness in the bargaining experiment? 
One aim of this research is to establish whether 
significant differences in negotiation style, as evidenced 
by verbal strategies, between Arab and American subject 
groups can be detected in a laboratory setting. Also 
of interest to the study is the relationship between the 
use of certain verbal bargaining strategies by subJects 
and their success in negotiating exchanges. These 
concerns are embedded in the idea that, despite 
communication barriers, subjects from different cultural 
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backgrounds are able to communicate with each other. 
SubJects' effectiveness in bargaining was 
measured by the rates of exchange they were able to 
negotiate in the experimental sessions. The analysis of 
the verbal strategies used by the subjects entailed 
content analysis of videotapes of the experiments. In 
the content analysis, based on a coding system developed 
by Alan Sillars (1980), types of strategies, their 
frequency, and the variations used were assessed. In 
addition, the length of time used by the subjects to 
reach agre~ment was related to types of strategies used 
and the rates of exchanges achieved in the experiment. 
The following hypotheses were investigated. 
1. The Arab subJects use more types of verbal 
strategies than the American subjects. 
2. The greater the number of types of verbal 
strategies used, the greater the bargaining 
effectiveness. 
Therefore: 
3. Arab subjects are more effective in bargaining 
than the American subJects. 
Furthermore: 
4. In bargaining there are no significant 
differences in communication effectiveness 
between the same culture dyads and the 
different culture dyads. 
However: 
5. In gaining similar effectiveness, there is a 
greater frequency of communication for the 
different culture dyads than for the same 
culture dyads. 
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It should be noted that this research was of an 
exploratory nature. The purpose of the hypotheses has 
been to help structure the research and the analysis of 
the data. 
These hypotheses are based on the following ideas. 
The structure of negotiation entails a series of 
information exchanges between individuals. This 
information, in part, consists of a series of verbal 
strategies. Types of verbal strategies reflect both the 
cooperative and competitive interests of negotiators. 
If outcomes are a function of communication 
effectiveness, then it may be plausible to argue that 
the greater the frequency and variation of strategy 
types used, the greater the bargaining effectiveness 
will be. If Arab subJects use a greater number of types 
of strategies, they will be more effective bargainers. 
Bargaining interaction is intentional. Bargaining 
participants have specific goals to be reached through 
interaction. Furthermore, there is a structure to the 
bargaining process which is not culture-bound. For 
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example, bargaining can involve a series of offers and 
counteroffers by the two subjects. The logical structure 
of this process, because it is not culture-bound, 
provides a known sequence to which the communications of 
self and other can be compared. As a consequence, 
communication errors can be more easily and precisely 
identified by subJects in bargaining than in less 
structured interactions. Thus there should be no 
significant difference in the effectiveness of 
communication between same culture and intercultural 
dyads. However, in reaching similar levels of 
effectiveness it may be that a greater volume of 
communication will be required in intercultural dyads 
as compared to same culture dyads. 
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Nature of The Study And Related Research 
A Problem in Cross-Cultural Communication 
A substantial volume of research has been done in 
cross-cultural communication. One of the major areas of 
emphasis has been the investigation of cultural barriers 
to communication. That area of concern is particularly 
pertinent to this study. At issue is the possible 
effects of cultural barriers on dyadic bargaining. Some 
scholars have argued that, due to cross-cultural barriers, 
effective communication between cultures is impossible. 
If that is so, effective bargaining between subJects of 
different cultures is not possible. Without effective 
communication, offers could not be understood and, as a 
consequence, could not generate appropriate responses. 
Other scholars have taken the position that, while not 
completely inhibiting, these barriers make communication 
difficult. If that is the case, perhaps greater frequency 
of communication is needed for intercultural communication. 
For example, in bargaining interactions in which time is 
limited (as was the case in this study) intercultural 
interactions may reach the time limit more often than 
interactions between subjects of the same culture. 
What are the sources of communication barriers? 
Larry A. Samovar and Richard E. Porter (1976) identified 
eight variables in the communication process which are 
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determined, at least in part, by culture. They argued 
that these variables influenced individuals' perceptions 
and thus the meanings attributed to behavior. The 
variables in the communication process are attitudes, 
social organization of the culture, thought patterns or 
forms of reasoning, societal roles and expectations, 
language skill, concept of space, time sense, and 
nonverbal communication. Individuals from different 
cultures may find it difficult to share meaning in 
communication with each other because they stand at 
different points on cultural variables. 
In his book, Beyond Culture (1979), Edward T. Hall 
analyzed cultures as being of high or low context. 
Communication in high context involves information passed 
in a physical context or internalized in the person. Low 
context communication is highly explicit. Differences in 
context between cultures can be a barrier to individuals 
in communication. 
An example of this difference in culture context was 
offered by Philip Harris and Robert Moran (1970). They 
stated that the American culture is one of low context; 
thus Americans emphasize sending accurate information 
messages and understand others' messages on the basis 
of what is said. In contrast, Japanese culture is one 
of extremely high context. The Japanese look for meaning 
in what is not said directly and find significance in 
pauses and silences. The differences in context make 
understanding far more difficult. 
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Karen Ann Watson (1977) found communication to be 
embedded in culture. She stated that there are 
" ••• assumptions underlying everyday life, shared by 
members of a society by virtue of constant interaction 
from birth, assumptions which are so much a part of tre 
culture that they are not even consciously held" (p. 103) 
which profoundly influence understanding in language. 
She argued that learning the language is not sufficient 
for cross-cultural communication because social rules, 
rules for speaking, must be mastered along with the 
linguistic rules. 
John c. Condon (1978) asserted that an individual's 
reasoning process, and thus his/her persuasive arguments, 
are profoundly affected by cultural variations. He 
delineated four areas of variation in persuasive 
communication as pertinent: language, nonverbal 
communication, value differences, and reasoning or 
rhetorical styles. Condon felt that these areas of 
variation refute any assumption that persuasion could 
be culture-free. 
Condon's view of the obstacles to persuasive 
cnmmunication presented by cultural background appear 
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quite similar to the more general concerns of Watson and 
Samovar and Porter. While they do not argue the 
impossibility of cross-cultural communication, all 
suggest that extensive knowledge of a culture is requisite 
for effective communication between people of different 
cultures. 
In a linguistic comparison of levels of meaning 
among three different nation groups in the translation 
of international diplomatic communications, Edmunds. 
Glenn (1966) argued that even when immediate meanings 
are shared, latent meanings exist which cannot be 
translated. According to Glenn, "Latent meanings may 
correlate with broad patterns of national behavior, 
including collective processes of decision making .... 
the underlying causes of conflict correlate with the 
communication that doesn't take place. As far as the 
communication that does take place, it apparently 
correlates only with the immediate and the superficial" 
(p. 272). 
In discussing the concept of national character, 
Jaris Draguns (1979) stated that, while a "concept of 
national character, in the sense of a uniform set of 
characteristics being associated with a n·ation state 11 
(p. 135) is obsolete, traditional behavior patterns 
occurred along with modern behaviors in individuals and 
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had an effect on interactions. 
Hamid Mowlana and Ann Elizabeth Robinson (1977) 
argued that competitive politics in contemporary society 
is characterized by "ethnic politics" and that these 
ethnic preferences are "intense and not negotiable" 
(p. 54). They asserted that issues in conflict 
resolution, and particularly diplomacy, must address 
ethnic consensus and conflict. 
Yet, Robert Jervis (1976), in applying and 
critiquing a variety of theories of conflict resolution 
to actual policy making in international relations, 
excluded any mention of effects of cultural variations. 
It is clear then that cultural differences do 
create communication barriers between individuals. The 
significance of these communication barriers is heightened 
by the costs of not communicating in situations of 
cross-cultural conflict resolution. It is probable that 
increased cultural knowledge and sensitivity help bridge 
these barriers. 
However, it should be noted that effective 
communication occurs regularly among people from 
different cultural backgrounds. These individuals, 
frequently without extensive sensitivity to or knowledge 
of cultural variations, still manage to communication 
with each other: about personal issues, business, and 
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even international relations. While individuals may be 
hindered by barriers, they still accomplish their goals, 
even in conflict situations. 
It is the position of this research that an 
underlying structure of intentionality serves to bridge 
the cultural barriers involved in communicating with 
individuals from another culture. Individuals communicate 
for a reason, a purpose. As such, they are able to 
overcome barriers, although sometimes with difficulty, 
in order to achieve their interaction goals. Of interest 
to this research is not simply the existence of barriers, 
but how people are able to deal with barriers. 
One communication area in which intentionality is 
particularly important is conflict resolution, an area 
in which individuals must interact to pursue their 
cooperative and competitive interests. For example, 
Samovar and Porter are undoubtedly correct that different 
cultures have different thought patterns and forms of 
reasoning. However, are all cultures different in all 
patterns and forms? If a process of conflict resolution 
like bargaining exists in different cultures, will that 
process, and the intentionality upon which it is based, 
produce similar thought and reasoning patterns across 
cultures? If so, then, for shared social processes, 
at least some kinds of communications barriers may not 
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exist. 
Similarly the issue of high and low context raised 
by Hall and investigated by Harris and Moran may vary 
little between cultures for some communication processes; 
such variation may be small because those processes are 
shared between the cultures. Similar comments could be 
made for Condon's view of reasoning processes, Glenn's 
view of shared meanings, and the others discussed above. 
Certainly there are important cultural variations which 
can produce communication barriers. But, it seems wrong 
to assume that those barriers must be equally present for 
all kinds of interactions. 
Research Issues in Cross-cultural Communication 
Some scholars have argued that cultural barriers to 
communication make any cross-cultural study questionable. 
Janice Hepworth (1978) questioned the value of much 
cross-cultural research study done in the behavioral 
sciences, and most particularly, experimental studies. 
She argued that American researchers have simply 
extended American research design with little 
consideration of what their effect or meaning is for 
subjects from different cultures. Further, she argued 
that language is a major problem because of differences 
in sub-surface translation (from the subject culture's 
native language) or problems in using English (as the 
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subject culture's second language). In this regard her 
concerns are similar to problems in meaning described by 
Glenn. 
In discussing the controversy over interpretation 
of observed behavior in other cultures, Lenore Loeb Adler 
(1982) recognized the difficulties cited by Hepworth, but 
argued that cross-cultural experimentation should be done. 
She suggested that perhaps scholars should "narrow the 
breadth of conclusions" (p. 10) and that in analyzing 
results, "we ought to be looking for variability and its 
cultural sources, rather than explaining it away when we 
find it" (p. 11). 
Hepworth may be right. Experimental study may have 
such widely different meaning for people of different 
cultures that results should not be compared across 
cultures. However, since she offers no proof for her 
position, it could also be argued, consistent with Adler, 
that the control which is possible in experimental study 
is of the greatest possible importance for the isolation 
of cross-cultural differences and the precise 
investigation of the interactions of people from 
different cultures. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that, in 
cross-cultural research too much attention has been 
given to isolating specific cultural variables, 
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particularly of the foreign cultures, while interaction 
between individuals from different cultures has been 
largely ignored. Tulsi B. Saral (1979) termed this type 
of research intracultural rather than intercultural. 
Stating that, to his knowledge, there had been no research 
in "interactional processes that occur when two or more 
individuals, believing in different modes of communicative 
reality, attempt to communicate with one another" 
(p. 397), Saral argued for the need for research in 
communication interaction. 
In support of that position, R. Michael Paige (1983) 
urged cross-cultural researchers to follow ''new lines of 
inquiry into the mutual impact of intercultural contact 
on the attitudes of both American and foreign students" 
(p. 103). Paige argued that, 
our understanding of inter-cultural 
relations is incomplete because little 
attention has been directed toward 
the role of the soJourner, representing 
the influence of the minority culture, 
in the process of intercultural learning 
among the members of the host country. 
(p. 103) 
Paige felt that, while cultural differences in 
values, perceptions and skills complicate communication, 
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the interaction through communication of the maJority and 
minority populations is significant in its effects on the 
majority populations. 
A study by Siti Suprapto questioned the idea of 
cultural background variations leading to communication 
breakdown. He studied conversations between an 
Indonesian/Javanese physician and his American patients. 
He found that two particular behaviors, the doctor's 
culturally-based strategy of using a type of deference 
statement in requesting information, and laughter, which 
differed in appropriateness from his patients' expectations, 
were accommodated by the patientsa Suprapto found that 
these discrepancies, rather than leading to communication 
breakdown, were instead stimuli for conversation. He 
concluded that, when participants realize each other's 
expectations for the relationship, effective communication 
across cultures is still possible. Suprapto's research 
directly addresses the question of communication barriers 
within the context of interactional behavior as called 
for by Saral. 
In contrast, there is a significant body of research 
having to do with cross-cultural conflict resolution 
which is not interactional, but instead focuses on 
the comparison of variables in different cultures. 
In some cases, researchers have not found 
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culturally-based variation. In a study of managerial 
influence, David Kipnis (1984) examined influence 
strategies used by managers in the United States, 
Australia, and Great Britain and found no difference in 
the relative use of different strategies by managers of 
different countries. 
In a study of conflict resolution tactics between 
married people in Japan, India, and the United States, 
Fumie Kumagai and Murray A. Straus (1983) focused on the 
incidence of violence and methods of resolving differences. 
Although the incidence of violence was highest in American 
couples, no significant differences in the way disputes 
were settled was uncovered in the three nation groups. 
Conflict resolution tactics were based on the principles 
of reciprocity in all three cultures. 
However, other studies have found significant 
cultural differences. In a study similar to that of 
Kumagai and Straus, V. Tellis-Nayak and Gearoid 
O'Donoghue (1982) found differences occurring among 
Irish, Indian (Asian), and American cultures. Again 
the level of violence was highest among Americans. 
However, they found a much greater incidence of male or 
female dominated relationships in India, in contrast to 
the idea of reciprocity. Their conclusion was that 
Indian and Irish role and status distinctions between 
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couples minimize marital conflict. 
The bargaining behavior of children and adolescents 
from three cultures (India, Argentina, and the United 
States) was investigated by Daniel Druckman, Alan A. 
Benton, Faizunisa Ali, and J. Susan Bagur (1976). They 
found the strongest effects were those of culture. 
Indian bargainers negotiated longer, were more 
competitive, and had larger ranges in their settlements 
than either the Argentinean or American subJects. 
Americans were most compromising in their offers. While 
males were more competitive in India and the United 
States, Argentinean females were more aggressive than 
their male counterparts. 
These studies, of which some found for cultural 
variation and some did not, would be termed intracultural 
by Saral, as they do not involve interaction between 
cultural groups. Studies which compare communication 
patterns in two or more cultures have had interesting 
results. But these studies may or may not directly bear 
upon intercultural studies as that term is used by Saral. 
For example, knowing the strategies used by managers 
in the United States and Britain does not mean that we 
can infer the kind of strategy a Briton might use when 
managing in the United States. Similarly, bargaining 
strategies might vary between two cultures. But would 
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individuals from those two cultures retain their culturally 
conditioned strategies in intercultural bargaining? At 
least part of the answer to this problem is found in 
certain intercultural experiments. 
In an experiment by Siegfried Streufer and Sandra 
Sandler (1973), Chinese and Americans were asked to 
participate on teams representing their culture in a 
tactical and negotiation game simulating an international 
political issue. Participants were asked to rate their 
own and their opponents• success and failure. It was 
found that while American and Chinese subJects did not 
markedly differ in how they rated their own success, 
Chinese participants perceived their opponents to be much 
more successful than the American participants did. 
James Alcock (1975) conducted dyadic bargaining 
experiments in which the payoff matrix varied from 
equality to inequality, using Canadian and East Indian 
subJects. He found that while Canadians were more 
cooperative in the advantaged position, the opposite was 
true for East Indian subJects who were more competitive 
in the position of advantage. 
In a laboratory experiment in which Japanese and 
American businessmen played a negotiation game, John 
Graham (1980) found significant cultural differences 
between the two groups. Successful performance was 
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found to be more important in terms of satisfaction with 
the experiment for American subjects than for the Japanese. 
Americans received higher performance scores by making 
opponents feel uncomfortable, while Japanese scored 
better by making opponents feel comfortable. It was 
noted that communication problems occurred during the 
negotiations. In some cases participants appeared to 
focus on quantitative information and pre-set goals. In 
these cases fewer new alternative solutions were suggested 
\ 
and mutual solutions wer~ reduced. 
Studies involving interaction between cultures have 
addressed Saral's call for intercultural research in 
cross-cultural study. They demonstrate not only the 
existence of cultural variations, but also the 
possibility of individuals from different cultures 
interacting, despite communication and cultural barriers, 
to achieve their task. 
This research recognizes that language and cultural 
barriers can exist and that these barriers can present 
problems in doing research -- particularly experimental 
research, as discussed by Hepworth and discovered in 
Graham's study of American and Japanese businessmen. 
However, it is essential to remember that communication 
regularly occurs between people of different cultures in 
spite of those cultural barriers. As has been pointed 
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out by Saraland others, understanding more about this 
interaction, its conditions and effects, is as important 
as understanding the barriers to interaction. 
This research is intercultural in that it includes 
subJects from two cultures in interaction with each 
other. What is of interest is how those subJects 
interact, in spite of possible communication barriers. 
But this research is also intracultural in that two of 
the experimental conditions were composed by pairing two 
subjects from the same culture, the Arab-Arab condition 
and the American-American condition. The two types of 
mono-culture dyads form a point of reference (two 
control groups) for the intercultural dyads. 
A greater understanding of intercultural communication 
seems particularly significant in the context of conflict 
resolution. Important interactions between individuals 
of different cultures occur daily, in business and in 
politics, with cooperative and competitive interests. 
With this in mind, the research design entailed an 
experimental bargaining situation in which two subjects 
pursued cooperative and competitive interests. 
Does bargaining evidence a structure of 
intentionality? Does that structure allow individuals 
from different cultures to overcome communication 
barriers caused by cultural variations? Linda L. Putnam 
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and Tricia S. Jones (1982) pointed out that in bargaining 
the emphasis is on "intentionality, rational rules of 
behavior, and strategic logic" (p. 263). As to the role 
of communication in bargaining, they stated that it 
functions as a means of coordinating outcomes, a form of 
information exchange, expression of strategic action, and 
a means of identifying patterns of behavior. The given 
patterns of intentional action required of subjects in 
bargaining experiments can decrease the possibilities 
for misunderstanding. Because bargaining entails a 
series of related communications to and feedback from 
another subJect, there are continual opportunities to 
correct misunderstandings. 
Finally, since it is an activity that occurs in a 
number of real-life contexts across a variety of cultures, 
bargaining is appropriate for intercultural, cross-
cultural study. As such, it puts the foreign subJects 
at less of a disadvantage than other types of experiments 
which may be more culture-specific. Most foreign 
subjects have participated in bargaining activities at 
home and have also had to do so in the United States. 
In some cultures bargaining skills are highly developed. 
In that case it may be that, not foreign subjects, but 
American subJects are disadvantaged. 
21 
Arab Culture and American-Arab Communication 
It is widely believed that members of Arab cultures 
have highly developed bargaining skills. Are Arabs more 
effective than Americans? Certainly verbal skills and 
an appreciation for language and its use have historically 
been very important in Arab cultures. Traditionally 
bargaining has been an important element in economic 
life in Arab nations. Arabs are reputed to be extremely 
persistent, if sometimes unreasonable, in bargaining and 
negotiation. In fact, a common stereotype held by many 
Americans about Arabs is that in bargaining situations 
they are emotional, confrontative, pugnacious, and 
long-winded. 
Generally, and for the purposes of this research, 
Arab countries have been defined to include Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, South Yemen, and the 
Persian Gulf Principalities. Certain other Middle Eastern 
countries, such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, are not 
considered Arab countries because of language or 
religious differences. Raphael Patai (1983) listed six 
criteria for inclusion: speaking Arabic, being raised 
in an Arab culture, living in an Arab country, belief 
in Islam, cherishing the memory of the Arab Empire, and 
citizenship of an Arab nation. Of these, he felt that 
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the linguistic criterion of speaking Arabic is the most 
universal and the most valid. It should be noted that 
the present national boundaries of Arab nations have 
not historically been as they are now and, even in 
contemporary times, many people have lived in more than 
one country. Thus, many Arabs have a much stronger 
identity as Arabs than as members of a particular nation. 
Historically Arabian people were identified as being 
in one of three socio-economic groups: urban dwellers, 
farmers, and Bedouins. These groups have had both 
similarities and differences. Urban life can be traced 
back to earliest historical times. William Polk (1980) 
noted that Mecca was an international city of trade even 
before the birth of Muhammad in 570 A.D. The center of 
Mecca and other cities was the mosque and the market 
place. Farmers provided food for urban dwellers, sold 
through the market place, and also traded with Bedouins. 
Historically the chief business of the Bedouins was 
long-distance import and export. This involved extensive 
interaction with foreign civilizations. However, 
according to Patai and Joel Carmichael (1977), this was 
also the basis for the development of a strong 
internal-external sense in regard to other peoples. 
The Bedouins accepted only the authority of their tribes; 
relationships with others were marked by feelings of 
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strong independence and a sense of equality. While there 
were differences, all three groups shared a common 
language, a strong oral tradition, and the market place 
as an important part of their lives. 
Polk argued that the role of language, by the late 
19th century, was the core of Arab identity. He said, 
"The speakers of Arabic found language, even more than 
Islamic religion, on which they disagreed, to be the core 
of their culture. The centrality of the language, the 
fascination with the word, the concern with the medium 
rather than the message has long been seen as a distinctive 
Semitic characteristic. Language is not an art form, it 
is the art of the Arabs" (p. 301-302). Polk pointed to 
the strong oral tradition, with its emphasis on the 
memorization of poetry and prayer, as evidence of this. 
Fahlawi means, in Persian, a sharp-witted, clever 
person. Patai described the characteristics of the 
Fahlawi personality, which he felt to be common, though 
not universal, in Arab men. These characteristics are 
1. ready adaptability (which can hide true 
feelings) 
2. self assertion - a persistent tendency to 
dominate things; demonstrate superiority 
3. exaggerated self-reliance 
4. reliance on individual activity and preference 
for it over group activity. (p. 107) 
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These characteristics are, perhaps, common to the 
view of the Arab as perceived by many Americans. Robert 
Trice (1981) found, in a study of pro-Arab policy lobby 
groups in the United States, that it is a view shared by 
many Americans of Arab extraction and other pro-Arab 
Americans. The Arab leaders in these lobbies who 
were not American-born were described as "domineering 11 
and "obstinate" (p. 124). A major complaint of others 
in the groups was that foreign-born Arabs could not 
present policy positions in an effective manner because 
of their emphasis on rhetoric and confrontational 
statements. 
It is possible that much of the reason for this 
perception comes from the Arabic language itself. Patai 
noted that, "Much of this prediliction for exaggeration 
and overemphasis is anchored in the Arab language itself ... 
the Arabic verb has various emphatic forms .... The Arabic 
verb also has special forms of conJugations which 
indicate a greater intensity of activity" (p. 52). 
Repetition is also at issue. "If an Arab wishes to 
impress his interlocutor with having definitely made up 
his mind to embark on a certain course of action, he will 
state several times what he intends to do, using series 
of assertions, often with increasing emphasis, and 
always with slight stylistic variations" (p. 53). 
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Khalid Mansour (1977) argued that the American 
stereotype of Arabs as pugnacious and emotional is 
enhanced by certain aspects of Arabic language. In 
discussing problems of communication in Arab-American 
diplomacy, he said, 
A student of Arabic realizes that exaggerations 
are used not necessarily to emphasize a 
point but rather because of linguistic 
exigencies of the tawkid, that is, the rule 
of emphatic assertion. A vehement reaction, 
loaded with threats, far from portraying a 
propensity to conflict, might be meant only 
to insult and humiliate the adversary ...• 
The truth and untruth of the statement ..• is 
irrelevant. What is relevant is the potency 
of the insult as conveyed by the words and 
similes used ..•. The tendency toward 
sloganeering in contemporary Arab politics 
is an outgrowth of this linguistic heritage. 
Slogans are repeated as if they would eventually 
be made to come true by the very dint of 
repeating them •.. (p. 141-142) 
However, other scholars have viewed the significance 
of these cultural differences in another light. Maxime 
Rodinson (1981), while recognizing that language creates 
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a bond among Arab peoples, argued against forming any 
comprehensive picture of Arab culture or cultural traits. 
Rodinson felt that individual differences are far more 
important than shared cultural traits. 
In an anthropological study of Middle Eastern 
bargaining, Fuad Khuri (1968) found that bargaining 
practices were integrative, not conflictual. He noted 
that while in bargaining, discussions were often 
emotional and extended, much of the interaction was 
designed to promote trust and establish a client 
relationship between the buyer and the seller. Khuri 
said that bargaining served two purposes: the pursuit 
of economic goals and social recognition. To that end, 
"Since profit in bargaining is translated into social 
recognition, seller-bargainers in the Middle East resort 
to all sorts of polite formulas to affect the economic 
choice of their partners" (p. 705). He further noted that 
expressions of respect, affection and common trust, as 
well as references to common friends and relatives, 
always preceded any negative or conflictual statements. 
It is not clear to what extent cultural stereotypes 
about Arab culture are accurate and what the role of 
communication barriers is in fostering misperceptions. 
However, it is clear that these issues are important. 
John Laffin (1975), although recognizing the 
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differences in Arab and American communication styles, 
felt that those differences were not insurmountable and 
that "Westerners, for the sake of rational relationships, 
must comprehend differences" (p. 23). 
Laffin's appeal may be extremely pertinent. 
Farideh Salili (1983) noted that "in recent years, 
despite increased interaction between the Moslem and 
Western worlds, understanding has decreased" (p. 143). 
Instead, stereotypes and misconceptions about Arabs have 
increased and become more negative. 
Many issues of culture and communication as they 
relate to Arab peoples have not been adequately addressed. 
For example, in a 1979 study, Geert Hofstede examined the 
connection between values and culture. Yet no Arab 
countries were included in the study. The book, 
Counseling Across Cultures, (Paul Pedersen, W.J. Lonner 
and Jaris G. Draguns, eds., 1976), is one of the most 
widely used books in the field of foreign student 
counseling. Although Arab students represent one of the 
three largest cultural groups studying in the United 
States, the book makes almost no reference to issues of 
counseling these students, even though an entire section 
is devoted to specific ethnic and cultural considerations. 
Goals of this research include examining whether 
there is substance to the idea that Arabs are particularly 
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effective bargainers. Are Arabs different from Americans 
in their bargaining style (as measured by verbal tactics)? 
Are there communication barriers and if they exist are 
they surmountable? Since it directly pertains to 
stereotyping Arabs as pugnacious and conflictual, does 
the style of bargaining most commonly used by Arabs 
focus on distributive (competitive) tactics? Or is the 
style integrative as Khuri asserts? Also of interest 
is whether Arab bargaining style differs between 
bargaining situations with Americans and with other 
Arabs. If Arabs adopt a style of bargaining when 
interacting with Americans which is different from that 
of the Americans, is that difference due to a fixed 
style which is culturally determined? Or is it due to 
the fact that they are interacting with someone of a 
different culture? Similar questions pertain to the 
fixedness or flexibility of Americans. By comparing 
mono-cultural and intercultural dyads, perhaps some 
answers may be found to these questions. 
Communication and The Experimental Study of Negotiation 
J.A. Rubin and B. Brown describe bargaining as a 
"process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle 
what each shall give and take or perform and receive, 
in a transaction between them 11 (p. 2). There is 
opposition of interest between participants. However, 
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negotiation is a joint decision making process because 
this opposition of interest is tempered by interdependence 
of the participants in reaching a settlement. 
Mixed-motive bargaining situations involve both the 
conflict of opposing interests and the need to cooperate 
to make an agreement profitable to both. Mixed-motive 
bargaining experiments require that all participants be 
able to profit from the exchange reached in negotiation, 
but that the degree of profitability be in competition. 
Thus bargaining is based jointly on distributive 
(competitive) and integrative (cooperative) elements. 
Initial research on the role of communication in 
bargaining took a very limited approach. According to 
Putnam and Jones (1982), " ... experimenters tested the 
effects of availability of communication (restricted or 
nonrestricted) and the orientation of negotiators 
(cooperative or competitive) on bargaining outcomes. 
This manipulation of communication centered upon the flow 
and transmission of messages, rather than upon the type 
or meaning of information" (p. 265). 
Furthermore, experimental research has frequently 
involved designs which effectively eliminate or 
stringently limit any communication interaction among 
experimental subjects. Examples of this type of research 
include studies on threats in bargaining situations by 
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L.A. Borah, Jr. (1963), M. Deutsch and R.M. Krauss 
(1960), P.J. Geiwitz (1967), and H.A. Hornstein (1965). 
However, H.H. Kelley (1965) asserted that in this type 
of study the limitations to the threat communications were 
so stringent that there were difficulties in the 
participants being able to perceive the communications 
as threats. 
Since those early studies, the study of the role of 
communication in bargaining experiments has expanded. 
Putnam and Jones (1982) stated that emphasis on 
communication has shifted from the flow of messages to the 
study of the types and effects of communication as part 
of the negotiation process. This shift has occured as 
part of the change in focus from negotiation outcome to 
negotiation process. 
Some experimental studies have addressed the 
relationship of communication to negotiation outcome. 
Henry McCarthy (1977) found that, in an experimental 
study in which subJects with divergent belief systems 
participated in discussions, communication among subJects 
served to reduce the intensity of the conflict, while lack 
of communication served to increase the intensity. 
The Miller, Brehmer and Hammond experimental study 
(1970) demonstrated that there was a significant difference 
in conflict resolution between dyads which discussed 
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their policies and practices and those dyads which did not. 
Those results were corroborated in another study done by 
Brehmer (1971) which further specified that communication 
increased agreements between subJects by increasing 
their perceived policy similarities. 
Justin Schulz and Dean Pruitt (1978) investigated 
whether the use of a competitive (individual) orientation 
or cooperative (team) orientation produced higher joint 
incomes when two conditions were met: either the 
subjects were allowed a high level of communication for 
information exchange or, when faced with limitations on 
communication, they were able to prioritize the issues in 
dispute, such that larger concessions could be made on 
less important issues. 
Though this research did not systematically vary the 
amount of communication between experimental runs, it 
did investigate a number of possible relations between 
communications in the bargaining process and the outcome 
of negotiations. Are some tactics more effective than 
others in avoiding confrontations, in reaching favorable 
agreements, or both? To address this question the 
subjects' communications were content analyzed. Content 
analysis measures are well established procedures in the 
area of conflict resolution for both experimental and 
descriptive studies. 
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Robert Bales (1950) developed a category system, 
Interaction Process Analysis, to record observations 
of verbal and nonverbal behavior in social interaction. 
This category system, while primarily applied to small 
group behavior, was developed by Bales to be relevant to 
a broad range of social systems. In fact, Bales's 
Interaction Process Analysis has been applied in both 
experimental and naturalistic settings. 
In order to study compliance-gaining strategies in 
persuasive situations, William Schenck-Hamlin, Richard 
L. Wiseman, and G.N. Georgacarakos (1982) developed a 
content analytic model. With their model, they were able 
to distinguish compliance-gaining messages from other 
message types. 
Thomas Beisecker (1970) used content analysis 
measurement as part of an investigation of verbal 
persuasive strategies in mixed-motive bargaining 
experiments. He found that "Under conditions where 
communication can influence the outcome of an interaction 
it can be used cooperatively and/or competitively ... " 
(p. 160) and that the use of communication strategies was 
related to the amount of conflictual interest perceived 
by the subjects and the persistence with which subjects 
maintained their positions. 
The content analytic category system used in this 
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research was developed by Alan L. Sillars (1980). This 
category system has been used by Sillars and associates 
for a variety of conflict situations. Sillars's coding 
system divides communication acts into three categories, 
with each category consisting of a number of types of 
statements. Avoidance acts minimize discussion of the 
conflict; distributive acts are competitive or 
individualistic; integrative acts are cooperative and 
disclosive. 
Sillars's categories fit well the structural 
conditions of mixed-motive bargaining. The two motives 
of the game correspond to the distributive and 
integrative categories, while the avoidance category 
indicates a third dimension to strategy variance. If 
Arab and American subjects have different bargaining 
strategies, the concentration of communications in one 
or another of the categories should differ. Thus, the 
counts, obtained from the content analysis, are the 
measure of strategy types. For this analysis, as detailed 
in Chapter III, the design of the experiments allowed 




The experimental design for this study called for 
two subJects to negotiate the exchange of counters 
(checker pieces) with each other. The counters served 
as symbolic resources and were assigned points. 
Subjects for the experiments were American and Arab 
students at the University of Kansas. Only male students 
were solicited for the following reasons. First, the 
number of Arab female students at KU is much smaller than 
the number of male Arab students. Therefore, the male/ 
female ratio for the pool of Arab subJects would have 
been markedly different than the pool of American subJects. 
Second, because of significant differences in sex roles 
between Arab males and females, Arab female subJects 
might have behaved differently from Arab males, as well 
as from American female subjects. While restricting the 
study to males may have limited its scope implications, 
it was f~lt that the elimination of possibly counfounding 
gender differences for this exploratory study was the 
more important consideration. 
American subjects were recruited from undergraduate 
Sociology classes. Arab students were randomly selected 
from a list of Arab males studying at the University of 
Kansas. This list was compiled from a roster of Arab 
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students at the University of Kansas, during Spring Semester 
1985, but excluded graduate students and students studying 
English at the Applied English Center. These exclusions 
guaranteed that the Arab subjects chosen were reasonably 
proficient in English and that their ages and educational 
experience were not unlike the American subjects. 
The experiment, based on a design by David Willer 
(1984), consisted of 24 trials. Since each trial had two 
subJects, there was a total of 48 subjects. For each of 
the three experimental conditions (both participants 
being American, both being Arab, and one being American 
and one being Arab), eight experimental trials were run. 
The conditions for the experimental trials, under all 
three conditions, were identical, and, in all cases, the 
goal of each subJect was to negotiate the best possible 
exchange for himself. 
Each experimental trial consisted of six bargaining 
(and exchange) periods. Each trial was divided into two 
partsof three periods. For each period subjects were 
given counters to represent resources and were asked to 
negotiate and, if possible, agree upon a rate of exchange. 
Each period began with the allocation of resources for 
exchange and ended with the conclusion of bargaining by 
the subjects and, when agreement was reached, with the 
exchange of resources. 
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Subjects were initially assigned to either an A or B 
position which differed by the score values for the counters. 
For each bargaining period, A received 15 black counters 
and B 10 red counters. Each counter A retained was worth 
one point; each counter A received from exchanging with 
B was worth one point. A was allowed to exchange any 
number of counters with B, but all of B's counters had 
to be exchanged as a unit. Thus, A's goal in exchange 
was to receive all 10 of B's counters, while giving B 
as few counters as possible. 
Of the 10 red counters allocated to B for each 
bargaining period, each counter B retained was worth no 
points. However, each counter B received from A was 
worth one point. Since B's 10 counters could only be 
exchanged with A as a unit, B's goal in exchange was to 
gain as many of A's counters as possible in return for all 
10 of B's own counters. 
Additional rules for bargaining governed the 
experiment. Any exchange had to be mutually agreed upon 
by the A and B subjects. Exchange was not mandatory 
if subJects could not agree on an exchange rate, the 
period ended with no exchange. Long term agreements 
which extended beyond any one bargaining period were not 
permitted. 
A total of six minutes was allowed for each 
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bargaining period. When subjects did not reach an 
agreement after five minutes, they were told that they 
had one minute in which to reach an agreement or decide 
not to exchange. After the additional minute, they were 
asked to report if any exchange agreement had been reached. 
As indicated, the experiment consisted of two parts, 
each including three bargaining periods. After three 
periods, subjects traded positions with A becoming Band 
vice versa. Then the two engaged in three more bargaining 
periods following the same rules. A coin toss determined 
which participant initially assumed the A position. In 
the American-Arab condition, it was necessary for the A 
position in the first part of the experiment to be 
assigned to American subjects in half the sessions and 
to Arab subjects in the other half. In order to assure 
this split, the result of the coin toss in one American-
Arab session had to be falsified. 
Each experimental session began with an introduction. 
Subjects were seated opposite each other at a table in 
the experimental room. The experimenter introduced the 
subJects to each other by their first names, introduced 
herself and made a brief statement about the experiment. 
This statement included the information that the 
experiment was an investigation of bargaining and 
exchange between individuals. However, it was not 
38 
disclosed that cultural variations were being studied as 
part of that investigation. During the introduction, 
the subjects were informed that the experiment would be 
videotaped and that after completion of the study the 
tape would be erased. 
Written instructions for the subjects were prepared 
(Appendix A) and were given to the subJects to read. 
When they finished reading the instructions, the 
experimenter reviewed the instructions with the subjects 
orally. Subjects were encouraged to ask questions about 
how the experiment worked at that time. 
As part of this discussion, the subjects were told 
that the instructions were for the first part of the 
experiment and that they would receive instructions for 
the second part when the first part was concluded. 
Subjects were told that the second part of the experiment 
lasted approximately the same amount of time as the first, 
that the entire experiment would last less than one 
hour, and that they would be asked to complete a brief 
written questionnaire (Appendix B) at the conclusion of 
the second part. An explanation of the video equipment 
was also included. However, the subjects were not told 
that the change occurring between the first and second 
parts of the experiment was simply the reversal of A for 
B (and B for A) positions. 
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The subjects were then asked to sign the written 
consent form (Appendix C). Following that, the experimenter 
flipped a coin to see which subject would assume the A 
position and which the B. 
As the experiment began, the subjects were given 
the appropriate counters, the starting time was recorded, 
and the subJects were told to begin the first period. 
Subjects then negotiated until they reached (or agreed 
that they could not reach) an agreement, within the 
specified time limits. The first period was concluded 
when an agreement was reached and subjects exchanged 
counters, when subJects agreed to discontinue negotiation, 
or when six minutes of negotiation had elapsed. At that 
point the score and time were recorded, and the counters 
were redistributed for the next period. This same 
sequence was followed until three bargaining periods were 
completed. 
At the conclusion of the third period, subJects were 
told that the first part of the experiment was over; at 
that time instructions for the second part of the experiment 
were given. Subjects were asked to reverse roles: A 
assumed the B role and B assumed the A role. Subjects 
were informed that the same rules applied for the second 
part of the experiment and, when necessary, the rules 
were repeated. The fourth period began when the counters 
were distributed, the time noted, and the subjects 
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indicated that they were ready to resume bargaining. 
Subjects followed the same procedure through three 
more bargaining periods. At the conclusion of the sixth 
period, videotaping ceased and subjects were told that 
the experiment was completed. They were thanked for 
their assistance and asked to take a few moments to 
complete the questionnaire. 
Evaluation of the experimental results focused on 
three key dependent variables. The measure for subjects' 
success in negotiation was derived from the scores 
earned by each subJect in the interaction. The numerical 
difference between the scores earned by each subject was 
used to judge the subjects' effectiveness. 
Also of interest was the number of times subjects 
were unable or unwilling to reach an exchange agreement. 
These instances are referred to as holdouts. Scores of 
15-0 reflected failure to reach agreement. 
As indicated in the discussion of the experimental 
design, the amount of time taken to reach agreement in 
each bargaining round was recorded. This measure was 
also used in analysis. 
Analysis of this data was done on three experimental 
conditions: Arab-American, Arab-Arab and American-
American. The Arab-Arab condition was used as a control 
for Arab results in the Arab-American bargaining sessions; 
the American-American condition was used for control for 
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the American subjects in the Arab-American condition. In 
addition to the comparison of the three experimental 
conditions, analysis also included comparison of the two 
subject populations, Arab and American. 
At least as important as the outcomes of the exchanges 
were the verbal tactics used by subJects in negotiating 
those exchanges. For this reason, all videotaped 
experimental sessions were content analyzed. This analysis 
involved the coding of each subject's statements during 
negotiation, using the category system of Sillars, as 
previously discussed (Appendix D). 
Sillars's coding system involves a number of categories 
in three maJor category groups: Avoidance acts, Distributive 
Acts, and Integrative Acts. For Avoidance Acts, verbal 
strategies could be coded in any of eight categories: 
simple denial, extended denial, underresponsiveness, topic 
shifting, topic avoidance, abstractness, semantic focus, 
process focus, Joking, ambivalence, and pessimism. 
Distributive Acts were coded as being faulting, 
rejection, hostile questioning, hostile Joking, presumptive 
attribution, avoiding responsibility, and prescription. 
For purposes of this analysis, complaints about the equity 
of proposed offers and/or unfair treatment in past 
performance were coded as being faulting. Hostile 
questioning was used as defined by Sillars. However, in 
addition, that category was used for a specific type of 
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interaction which was otherwise extremely difficult to 
code. Upon occasion, subjects engaged in very rapid, 
very competitive statements, frequently talking at the 
same time. These instances were coded as hostile 
questioning. The prescription category was used for 
coding all threat and ultimatum communications. 
The categories for Integrative Acts included 
description, qualification, disclosure, soliciting 
disclosure, negative inquiry, empathy or support, 
emphasizing commonalities, accepting responsibility, and 
initiating problem-solving. Their use in the analysis 
followed the descriptions established by Sillars. 
The application of Sillars's coding system to 
subJects' verbal tactics in the experiment generated 
data about the total frequency of verbal tactics used by 
subJects, the frequency of each category used, and the 
range of tactics used by subjects. The data generated 
from the analysis of strategies was then related to the 
rates of exchange generated by the subJects, in the 
three conditions, and the variations of the two cultural 
groups involved. 
One concern of this research is the relative 
effectiveness of communication in same culture dyads as 
compared to intercultural dyads, as mentioned in hypotheses 
4 and 5. For this research, the measure of communication 
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was the presence or absence of an error in the offer/ 
counteroffer sequence. An error was considered to be 
the making of an offer by one subject which is less 
advantageous to that subject than a previous offer by 
the other subJect or a statement which made no sense in 
the context of the interaction. Such statements were 
separately coded in the analysis of bargaining sessions. 
As a measure of reliability, a check on inter-coder 
agreement was performed, following the procedure set 
forth by Ole Holsti (1969). Independent coding of two 
experimental sessions by another Communication Studies 
graduate student, who received some training in the use 
of the categories, resulted in observed agreements of 
92% and 96%. When the formula for adJustment for 
inter-coder agreement resulting from chance was applied, 
agreement was measured as 86% and 93% respectively. 
Finally, data from the brief questionnaire (completed 
by subJects following their participation in the 
experimental sessions) was used. The questionnaire 
addressed the subjects' perceptions of their negotiation 
styles and skills, as well as their perceptions of their 
fellow students. Questionnaire responses were used to 
inform and enrich the other data generated. 
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Results 
In this chapter, the results of the experimental 
study are analyzed and discussed. Those results include 
the exchanges negotiated in the bargaining sessions, the 
incidence of nonagreement between subJects, the amount of 
time spent by subJects in interaction, and the types of 
verbal strategies used by subJects. Also reported are 
instances of communication breakdown, questionnaire results, 
and observations of the interactions by the experimenter. 
Initial summary data for the variables to be 
analyzed and interpreted in this section are presented 
in Table 1. Results are presented for each of the three 
experimental conditions: Arab-American, Arab-Acab, and 
American-American. For the Arab-Arab and for the 
American-American conditions, the score differences 
were determined by subtracting the loser's score from 
the winner's in each of the eight experimental sessions 
for that condition. The figures given in Table 1 are 
the means of that number for the two conditions. For 
the Arab-American condition, the difference in scores 
is given in two ways. For the left column, the American 
score was subtracted from the Arab score, resulting in 
a mean difference of 3.5. In the second column, the 
loser's score was subtracted from the winner's (regardless 
of cultural group), resulting in a mean difference of 
5.5. 
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Although the difference between the winner and loser 
was used for the tabulation of exchange outcomes, such a 
distinction was not applicable to all elements of the 
data. Holdouts and interaction time are interactional 
data and cannot be attributed to one or another subject in 
an experiment. Thus the figure reported is representative 
of interactions in the experimental runs, not of one or 
the other subject in the bargaining session. 
Table 1 
Mean Exchange Outcomes, Percent Holdouts and Mean Times 








Percentage 10% 10% of Bargaining 
Interaction 
Time Used for 
Interaction: 18.75 18.75 Mean 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Mean Exchange Outcomes, Percent Holdouts and Mean Times 



















Analysis of Exchange Outcomes for the Three Experimental 
Conditions 
Differences in exchange outcomes in the three 
conditions ranged from a high of 36 points (earned in an 
Arab-Arab exchange) to a low of 1 point (earned in an 
American-American exchange). The Arab-Arab and 
American-American conditions each produced one tie. This 
was 1.n contrast to the three ties produced in the Arab-
American experimental condition. (Raw scores for exchange 
outcome differences in each of the three experimental 
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conditions are provided in Appendix E.) 
In the Arab-American condition, the Arab subjects 
had, overall, better exchange outcomes. Of the eight 
sessions, the Arab subjects won three, the Americans two, 
and three resulted in a tie. For all sessions, Arab 
subjects scored 28 more points, resulting in a mean 
difference of 3.5. As seen in Table 1, the mean 
difference for this condition, when figuring winner-
loser differences, is 5.5. This figure falls between the 
mean difference for the Arab-Arab condition (8.5) and 
~.merican-Arnerican condition (4.5). This suggests that 
the inter-cultural exchanges were not unlike the 
mono-cultural ones. 
Was the variation of scores between cultures greater 
or lesser than might normally be expected to occur within 
mono-cultural interactions? In order to determine the 
normal variation of mono-cultural experimental results, 
the following analysis was performed. There was an 
arbitrary arrangement of the score difference for the 
Arab-Arab and American-American experimental conditions. 
In that arrangement, the difference in the scores was 
calculated by subtracting the scores of subJects who 
were A's in the first part of the experiment from the 
scores of subJects who were B's. From these score 
differences a mean difference of 8 for the Arab-Arab 
condition and 2.5 for the American-American condition was 
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derived. 
These mean differences were then used for comparison. 
A bivariate t-test was run to compare the Arab scores in 
the Arab-American condition to the Arab score;in the 
Arab-Arab condition and the American scores in the 
Arab-American condition were compared to the American 
scores in the American-American condition. In both 
statistical tests, no significant difference was found. 
In addition, a univariate t-test was run to test 
whether the mean difference of 3.5 found in the Arab-
American condition was significantly different from 0. 
It was found not to be significantly different at the 
.05 level. 
While Arab subjects did better overall in the 
Arab-American condition, with a difference of 28 more 
points, that advantage was not significant statistically. 
Thus it would not appear to uphold the hypothesis that 
Arabs are better bargainers. However, in looking at the 
mean differences in all three experimental conditions, no 
statistically significant differences were found. The 
lack of statistical significance is not surprising given 
the very small sample sizes and the variations in 
outcomes among runs. On the other hand, it would be 
wrong to assume that the data show that the Arab subJects 
were not better bargainers than the Americans. Though 
not statistically significant, the mean difference of 3.5 
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is similar in magnitude to the 4.5 difference produced 
by subtracting losers from winners in the American-American 
condition. 
Furthermore, the 5.5 winner-loser mean difference 
for the Arab-American condition falls between the 8.5 and 
4.5 differences for the mono-cultural dyads. This 
suggests that the inter-cultural data were not different 
in kind from the mono-cultural data and that communication 
barriers were not significantly more important than in 
the mono-cultural dyads. 
One measure of communication effectiveness is the 
standard deviation of exchange outcomes. If there are 
important communication barriers, outcomes should vary 
greatly as a consequence. By the same reasoning, 
assuming there is some determinancy to the experiment, 
if communication is effective, error variance should be 
small. 
In fact, the standard deviation of the outcomes of 
the inter-cultural (Arab-American) condition was between 
the standard deviation of the outcomes of the two 
mono-cultural conditions. This suggests that 
communication barriers due to cultural differences were 
not important phenomena in the study: 
Holdouts 
As previously described, holdouts refer to those 
instances in which subjects were not able to reach a 
mutually agreed upon exchange. In the experimental 
sessions, such holdouts sometimes occurred at the 
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deadline time of six minutes. At other times subjects 
mutually agreed before the deadline time that no exchange 
was possible. As noted in Table 1, there was little 
difference in the number of holdouts occurring in the three 
experimental conditions. The Arab-American condition 
produced 5 holdouts, for 10% of the interactions. The 
Arab-Arab condition produced 7 holdouts, for 15%. The 
American-American condition produced 6 holdouts, for 13%. 
While little importance can be attached to such small 
differences, it is interesting to note that the inter-
cultural (Arab-American) condition produced the fewest 
number of holdouts. 
Interaction Time 
The mean time for interaction for each of the three 
experimental conditions is also shown in Table 1. As 
can be seen, the mean time for the inter-cultural 
condition, 18.75, falls between the mean for the Arab-Arab 
condition, 19.37, and the American-American condition, 
17.25. If it is assumed that the amount of communication 
is indicated at least in part, by interaction time, these 
figures do not support the hypothesis that a greater amount 
of communication is necessary, in order to overcome 
communication barriers caused by cultural differences in 
inter-cultural bargaining. 
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However, given that effective bargaining-was observed 
in the Arab-American condition, it may be that an increased 
amount of communication was simply not necessary for 
effective bargaining under the inter-cultural condition. 
These results can be contrasted to the study by Graham 
in which it was found that interaction between American 
and Japanese businessmen in an experimental setting 
frequently degenerated to simple numerical bidding, 
involving little time but also little interaction. 
In order to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference for the amount of interaction time 
used between Arabs in the Arab-American condition and 
Arabs in the Arab-Arab condition, and between Americans 
in the Arab-American condition and Americans in the 
~.merican-American condition, t-tests were,run. No 
statistical difference was found in either comparison. 
Because the interaction time differed the most 
between the Arab-Arab condition and the American-American 
condition, at-test was also run to see if Arabs used 
significantly more time in their interactions. Again, 
there was no significant statistical difference. 
In examining the range of time used for interaction 
in the three conditions, it was found that the smallest 
time elapsed in the American-American interactions: six 
minutes. The greatest elapsed time was in the Arab-
American interaction: 34 minutes. Table 2 indicates the 
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range of interaction time for each of the three expexi~ental 
conditions. 
Table 2 
Range of Interaction Times for the Three Experimental 
Conditions 
Arab-American Arab-Arab American-American 
Minimum-
Maximum 7-34 11-31 6-29 Interaction 
Time: 
Minutes 
Range: 27 20 23 Minutes 
A~ can be seen in Table 2, the interaction time range 
was least for the Arab-Arab condition, showing that there 
was less variation than in the American-American condition, 
and thus, greater homogeneity. In contrast, the Arab-
American condition shows the greatest amount of variation 
in interaction time. But note that the shortest time 
taken for Arab-American interactions was still greater 
than the shortest time taken in the American-American 
condition. 
Analysis of the Populations 
This discussion has focused on the analysis of 
results as they pertain to each of the three experimental 
conditions. However, it is also possible to organize 
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the data such that the two subject populations, Arab 
and American, can be examined. A comparison of the 
scores for exchange outcomes of the Arab and American 
subJects shows very little difference between the two 
groups. The 24 experimental sessions yielded a total of 
1719 points for Arab subJects and 1704 points for American 
subjects. The mean score for the Arab subjects was 
71.63; the American mean score was only slightly less, 71. 
The difference in summed scores between the 
populations, 15, was less than the difference of 28 
observed in the Arab-American experiments. This means 
that the Arabs, when negotiating with Arabs, earned 13 
fewer points than did Americans when negotiating with 
Americans. That fewer points were earned in the Arab-Arab 
interactions is explained by the higher rate of holdouts 
under that condition, for in the case of any holdout, no 
points were earned for that trial by either subject. 
(See Table 1). 
An examination of the interaction time for each of 
the subJect populations shows that Arab subjects spend 
a slightly longer time period in bargaining than the 
American subjects. The mean interaction time for Arab 
subjects was 19.17 minutes, while the mean interaction 
time for American subJects was 17.75. 
While the score differences were too small to 
interpret, and the time differences for populations were 
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not statistically significant, the greater time taken by 
Arabs deserves some comment. It should be noted that the 
mean time taken in the Arab-Arab interactions was greater 
than the mean time taken in American-American interactions, 
with Arab-American interactions falling between the two. 
(See Table 1). This implies that the medial time of the 
Arab-American interaction was due to the propensity of 
Arabs to bargain longer than Americans, an interpretation 
also suggested by the population sums. 
Verbal Strategies 
Analysis of the verbal strategies used by subjects in 
this study involved content analytic coding of the 
statements into a number of categories, based on Sillars's 
coding system. (See Chapter Two.) These categories were 
grouped as Avoidance Acts, Distributive Acts, and 
Integrative Acts. For the purposes of analysis, the data 
is presented for both the total number of statements made 
by subjects and the percentages of those statements which 
fall into the Avoidance, Distributive, and Integrative 
categories. 
Table 3 shows the mean total count of verbal statements 
used by subjects in each of the three experimental 
conditions. The mean total count for verbal strategies 
(and that count divided by the mean interaction time) 
were based upon the summation of both participants' total 
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counts. When calculating for the mean count adJusted 
for interaction time, the total count for both subjects 
was the basis for that ratio. 
Table 3. 
Mean Verbal Strategies and Their Rate by Type of 
Interaction 
Arab-American Arab-Arab American-American 
Mean Total 











It can be seen from Table 3 that there is a positive 
correspondence between the amount of verbal statements 
used by subJects in the three conditions and the amount of 
time used in interaction (as given in Table 1). In both 
cases the largest numbers were produced for the Arab-Arab 
condition, then for the Arab-American condition, and last 
for the American-American condition. The calculation for 
the mean total count of verbal statements when adjusted 
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by interaction time shows that the rate of verbal statements 
was similar for the three conditions. The similarity of 
those rates implies that the inter-cultural interactions 
were similar to the mono-cultural interactions, at least 
insofar as rate of verbal strategies is concerned. 
It might appear that the Arab subjects were generally 
more "talkative" and that the results for the Arab-American 
) 
condition were actually a kind of averaging of the higher 
level of talkativeness shown by the Arabs in the Arab-
Arab condition and the lower level of talkativeness 
produced by the Americans in the American-American 
condition. However, an examination of the raw data shows 
that this was not the case. (See Appendix F). In looking 
at that data it can be seen that, in the Arab-American 
condition, the American subJects had higher frequency 
counts than the Arab subJects in seven of the eight 
experimental sessions. In the one session in which the 
Arab subject had a higher total count for verbal 
strategies, that value was only one point higher than for 
the American subject. Thus, it would not appear that 
these results are merely a measure of "talkativeness" by 
cultural group, but that the intercultural interaction may 
have had special dynamics of its own. 
The raw data in Appendix F has been recorded such 
that, for one member of each dyad in each condition, 
the scores reflect the number of verbal strategies used in 
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descending order of frequency. From this ordering it can 
be determined whether there was any correspondence between 
frequency of strategies employed by the subjects as they 
were paired in experimental sessions. In fact, it was 
found that, in most cases, the rank of verbal strategy 
count of the two subJects was the same. Such was the case 
in all of the Arab-American interactions and in all the 
American-American interactions. The Arab-Arab condition 
showed only two exceptions. In one case, the rank order 
was off by only one place; in the other case the placement 
was off by only two. This data suggests that the context 
of the interaction was an important determinant of the 
subjects' behavior, for, within that context, the two 
influenced each other's behavior. 
Did winners employ more strategies than losers? Is 
there a relation between the frequency of verbal strategy 
and success in exchange? For all three conditions, 
there were 19 experimental sessions which resulted in 
winners and losers (five of the sessions resulted in tied 
scores). Of those 19 sessions, in 8 the winner had a 
higher count for frequency of verbal strategies; in 11 the 
winner had a lower count than his fellow participant. 
For the Arab-Arab condition in which there were a total of 
7 winning sessions, 3 of the winners had a higher count 
and 4 of the winners a lower count. The American-American 
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conditions also resulted in seven winning sessions. In 
them, three winners had lower counts and four winners had 
higher. However, in the Arab-American condition, only 
one winner used more verbal strategies than his partner; 
in the other four cases the winner used fewer. Thus 
greater frequency in verbal strategy was not related to 
winning for Arab subjects and not strongly related for 
Americans. , 
Because the greatest difference in frequency of 
verbal strategy occurred between the Arab-Arab condition 
and the American-American condition, at-test was run. 
No significant difference in mean frequency was found. 
In addition, the mean frequency of the Arab-American 
condition was compared to the mean frequency of both 
mono-cultural groups together. Though the mean frequency 
of the Arab-American condition of 707 was higher than 
the mean frequency of the mono-cultural conditions (688), 
the difference was not significant. 
Ignoring tests of significance, these data imply that 
the interaction in the inter-cultural condition consisted 
of more than just the averaging or combination of cultural 
traits demonstrated by subjects elsewhere. While Arab 
subJects in the mono-cultural condition exhibited the 
greatest frequency of verbal strategies of any of the 
conditions, they had fewer counts in the Arab-American 
condition than their American cohorts. In addition, 
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while greater frequency of verbal strategy proved to be a 
winning strategy only in the American-American condition, 
the Arab subjects in the Arab-American condition (who won 
more often than the American subjects) demonstrated the 
least use of greater frequency as a winning strategy. 
Clearly, there were some differences of style and strategy 
in the inter-cultural interaction which cannot be accounted 
for by cultural traits. 
Categories of Verbal Strategies 
The results showing the use of verbal strategies by 
category type, as determined by the content analysis, 
are reported in Table 4. The Arab-American condition has 
been reported in two ways: by the cultural group of the 
subjects and by who won and who lost the exchange. The 
other two experimental conditions have been reported by 
winner and loser only. The winner-loser delineation has 
been used in order to Judge subJects' effectiveness in 
using the various categories. For that reason, the 
results for subJects who generated tied scores have been 
excluded from the analysis. 
The percentages shown were produced by generating 
percentages for the frequency of a particular category 
as compared to that subJect's overall frequency of verbal 
strategy. From those percentages, the mean percentage 
for the group was calculated. This was done so that 
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the results for subjects who had a larger number of 
statements would not overwhelm the data from subJects with 
lower numbers. By using proportional communication, each 
subject's use was weighted equally. 
Table 4 
Percentage of Avoidance, Distributive and Integrative 
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In examining the data for the Avoidance category, it 
can be seen that, for the Arab-Arab condition, winning 
Arabs used fewer avoidance statements than losing Arabs. 
This is in contrast to the American-American condition, in 
which winning Americans used a greater number of Avoidance 
statements than the losers. In the Arab-American condition, 
Arab subJects {winning or losing) used fewer avoidance 
statements, while the American subjects (winning or losing) 
used a great number. This distinction may well indicate a 
cultural difference. 
This same pattern occurred in the use of statements 
coded as Distributive strategies. Arabs used distributive 
acts less often as winners in the Arab-Arab condition and 
less often as winners or losers in the Arab-American 
condition. In contrast, American subJects who were 
winners in the American-American condition used 
distributive strategies more often, as they also did in 
the Arab-American condition. 
This pattern is reversed in the Integrative category. 
American winners in the American-American condition used 
integrative strategies less frequently than the losers; 
they also used integrative strategies less than Arab 
subjects in the inter-cultural condition. However, Arabs 
in the Arab-Arab condition used more integrative statements 
to win, as they also did in competition with Americans in 
the Arab-American condition. This is reflected in the 
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data for each cultural group and for the winner-loser group. 
It would appear then that Arabs used more integrative 
and less distributive strategies than the American subjects. 
This is particularly interesting in light of the research 
which represents Arabs as being highly competitive and 
aggressive in conflict situations. 
Index of Evenness of Distribution in Categories Used 
One of the hypotheses of this research was that the 
use of a greater range of verbal strategies would result 
in more effective bargaining. In order to infer that 
range, the following procedure was developed. For each 
subJect, the percentage for the category with the second 
greatest frequency was taken, regardless of the type of 
category. The mean for each group was then the mean of 
these percentages. In interpreting the mean value, it 
should be pointed out that the distribution of counts 
among the three categories was very uneven. That is, 
about 10-15% of the counts were in the avoidance category 
with the rest falling in distributive and integrative. 
Therefore, a large count in the second highest category 
implied a relatively even distribution between the two 
categories with the highest frequency of counts. Thus a 
percent for the second category of as high as 36.4, as 
occurred for the Americans in the Arab-American interaction, 
indicated a more even distribution than the 29.8 of the 
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Arabs. Again, as this interpretation was concerned with 
effectiveness in_bargaining, tie scores were not included 
in the calculation. Table 5 shows the results of this 
analysis. 
Table 5 
Index of Evenness of Distribution of Verbal Strategies 
by Type 
% of Middle 
Category 



















In general, winners had better distribution by this 
measure than losers, as measured by the mean of the middle 
score category. For the Arab-American condition, Arab 
subjects won more often but their distribution was not as 
good. However, as was seen earlier, this is a result of 
the heavy reliance on integrative tactics shown by the 
Arab subjects in this condition. 
Illogical Communication as a Measure of Communication 
Barrier 
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One measure for the existence of communication 
barriers is the presence of illogical communication 
statements in the interaction. These communications may 
be statements that are meaningless in the context of the 
conversation or are not logical responses to statements 
by another person in the interaction. In bargaining 
situations, such as this experimental study, offers or 
bids which do not fit the logical sequence of bidding may 
be considered illogical communications. 
For the purposes of this research, the incidences of 
these illogical communications were recorded during the 
coding of the sessions. Such statements were considered 
to be indications of communication barriers. Of interest 
was whether such communications occurred, whether the 
barriers they indicated were surmounted (or lead to 
communication breakdown), and whether their occurrence 
varied by experimental condition or cultural population. 
Illogical offers were noted when a subject, usually 
in response to an offer from the other subject, made an 
offer which was less favorable to himself. Such offers 
could be considered illogical only when they were in the 
context of competitive bargaining interactions. On a 
few occasions, subjects chose to make only equitable 
65 
exchanges. On those occasions, a subject sometimes 
rejected a more favorable offer and made an offer less 
favorable to himself. However, since it was clear that 
the less favorable offers were made to maintain equity in 
the exchange interaction, those events were not coded as 
illogical. 
Only one illogical offer occurred in the Arab-American 
and only one in American-American conditions. (In the 
Arab-American condition, that offer was made by an Arab 
subject.) In both cases, the bidding error did not lead 
to communication breakdown. Rather, the error was 
immediately corrected and the bargaining continued. In 
the Arab-Arab condition, two illogical offers occurred. 
In those cases as well, the offer was immediately 
corrected; no breakdown in communication occurred. In 
one of those instances, the correction was made at the 
suggestion of the other subject, who simply said, "You 
don't mean that." 
Only one other instance of illogical communication 
occurred in any of the three conditions. In one instance, 
an Arab-American bargaining session, the subjects briefly 
discussed an aspect of the scoring, and, in so doing, 
talked past each other. That dialogue lasted about 30 
seconds, at which point the Arab subject rephrased his 
original statement and the American subject said, "Oh, I 
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see." Then the subjects were able to resume bargaining 
and had no further problems. 
Indications of communication barriers occurred rarely. 
In all cases subjects became aware of their errors and 
corrected them. Only one of these errors occurred between 
two Americans; for Arabs, the frequency of occurrence was 
the same for Arab-American and Arab-Arab interactions. 
It may be that the latter events stemmed from the 
difficulty, for Arabs, of thinking and speaking in a 
second language. In any case, as a consequence of the 
logic of the bargaining process, those errors were easily 
corrected and at no time resulted in communication 
breakdown. 
Questionnaire Results 
A questionnaire was administered to subjects' at the 
conclusion of each experimental session. (See Appendix B.) 
It consisted of fairly open questions; it was hoped 
that subjects' responses might enrich and enhance the 
other data. Those responses which were quantifiable are 
reported in Appendix G. Responses by subjects did not 
indicate any major differences among the experimental 
conditions. However, in looking at the responses when 
grouped by cultural background, both similarities and 
differences appear between the Arab subjects and the 
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American subjects. 
When asked how they felt about participating in the 
experiment, subjects' responses, both Arab and American, 
were generally favorable. Most subjects responded that 
it was fun or challenging. However, three Arabs (13% 
of the Arab population) indicated that they found it to 
be unpleasant or that they did not like bargaining. 
Their comments included, "Making an exchange was most of 
the time unpleasant.", "For me, it is an unpleasant event 
all the time,", and "It was fun, but I don't like to 
bargain." 
Seven American subjects (29% of the American 
population) expressed negative opinions about the 
experiment. One felt "tense and apprehensive"; one did 
not like being in the "powerful" position. Five of the 
subjects expressed displeasure with losing and with being 
in the less "powerful" position. 
These responses are suggestive. The negative Arab 
responses implied a dislike for the bargaining situations 
generally. The negative American responses indicated a 
more competitive attitude, with displeasure stemming from 
being in a less "powerful" or "losing" position. 
In comparing the experiment to other situations in 
which they have bargained, some subjects, both Arab and 
American, noted that the chips had no real value. 
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Generally, Arab subjects made more further comparisons. 
Their comments included that it was easier than other 
' 
bargaining experiences, that one had absolute power as 
A not present in real life, that one had little control, 
that the experiment took a longer time period than other 
bargaining experiences, or that the time was too short 
to effectively bargain. 
As to their perceptions of how the other subject felt 
in the experiment, 60% of the respondents felt that the 
other subject felt good about the experiment, or "about 
the same" as they did. Some subjects did note that their 
opponent was apprehensive or unhappy about the exchanges. 
These comments were usually made by the winners of the 
exchanges. 
Subjects• responses to the question concerning their 
purpose in the experiment generally indicated 
understanding of the game, that is, negotiating to gain 
as many points as possible. One American subject (who 
arranged absolutely equal exchanges throughout his 
experimental session) noted that his purpose was to see 
"how society has effected our understanding of the 
concept of exchange." One Arab subject listed one of 
his purposes as being to "observe the other person and 
how he thinks." 
The majority of the subjects (73%), Arab and American, 
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were satisfied with the exchanges they made. However, 
four Arabs (]7%) and eight Americans (33%) were dissatisfied. 
In most of the cases of dissatisfaction, those subjects 
had lost in the exchange. 
Of the Arab subjects, four would have preferred more 
time for the experiment; seven would have preferred less 
time. One Arab subject noted that, while the amount of 
time was satisfactory, he would have preferred more 
"variables", "bribes" and "distractions". Only two 
American subjects wanted more time, but eight would have 
preferred less. Only a few subjects, either Arab or 
American, felt that the time limit affected how they 
acted. 
A majority of the subjects reported that they were 
fair to the other subject (77%) and that the other subject 
was fair to them (65%). A few of the Arab and American 
subjects felt that they were fair to the other subject, 
but were not treated fairly. Some of the subjects who 
won were uncomfortable about how they had treated the other 
subject; some confessed to lying and "taking advantage". 
One American subject inquired, "Who's to decide what's 
fair? 11 Another stated that fairness was not the point of 
the game. One Arab subject said that fairness was 
relative. Generally, there did not seem to be any great 
difference in how Arab and American subjects viewed the 
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issues of equity and fairness. 
Consistent with their positive reactions to 
participating in the experiment, almost all the Arab 
subjects indicated that they liked bargaining to reach a 
decision or make an exchange. One subject indicated that 
it saved money1 another that it was a good way to get to 
know people. Three subjects (who have been previously 
reported as being unhappy about the experiment) found 
bargaining to be unpleasant. Five American subjects 
expressed some reservations about bargaining to reach an 
agreement. One of these subjects reported that he had 
been a salesman and found haggling unpleasant. 
A majority (64%) of the subjects felt that they were 
goad bargainers. Several Arab subjects indicated that 
their success at bargaining was qualified. That is, it was 
dependent upon the situation, who they were bargaining 
against, and what they were bargaining for. Very few 
subjects (Arab or American) commented negatively about 
their opponents' bargaining skill. 
Both Arab and American subject groups named similar 
consumer commodities when asked about real-life situations 
in which they had to bargain. The most common of these 
was the purchase or sale of a car. Other consumer 
commodities mentioned were stereos, bicycles and houses. 
Trading baseball cards was a bargaining situation mentioned 
only by same Americans. Arabs mentioned shoes, books and 
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carpets as other consumer items to be negotiated. Similar 
bargaining events mentioned by American subjects included 
Monopoly games, relations with parents and friends, 
negotiations with professors about grades, and shopping 
in markets in foreign countries (Israel, Mexico). Arab 
subjects made no mention of negotiations with friends or 
relatives, but referred to shopping in marketplaces at 
home (Lebanon, Kuwait, Sudan, Egypt). Arab subjects also 
mentioned negotiating with professors for grades. Political 
issues were mentioned as real-life bargaining situations 
by Arab subjects. 
In discussing when bargaining would be inappropriate 
or wrong, there were similarities and differences between 
Arab and American subjects. Arab subjects most frequently 
noted specific items or situations in which bargaining was 
not practical: when prices are fixed, in restaurants, 
when exchanging currency, attending movies, in U.S. 
clothing and department stores. On a more general level, 
they also frequently mentioned that it was useless to try 
to bargain when the other person was an employee, and thus 
had no authority. Ethical considerations arose. Some 
instances cited included when the other person does not 
want to negotiate, or when the seller is honest. 
Americans also cited some specific conditions such 
as when prices on certain items are fixed and, more 
generally, when the employees do not have the authority 
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to make a deal. However, more of their responses to 
this question dealt with more abstract issues: when there 
is mutual interest, when the price is fai~ when something 
is bought for a cause, when bargaining makes people 
unhappy, and, frequently mentioned, in life or death 
situations. Also mentioned as inappropriate was plea 
bargaining in the U.S. judicial system. 
It might be that there were fewer ethically 
inappropriate instances for bargaining mentioned by 
Arabs because they viewed bargaining as much more a 
marketplace phenomenon. While American subjects mentioned 
negotiations with parents and friends, and doing favors 
for and paying off debts to friends as real-life 
bargaining situations, no such mention occurred at all 
in the Arab subject responses. That distinction may 
represent a cultural difference. Arabs may not perceive · 
their interactions with people close to them as bargaining 
relationships, or perhaps they do not enter into 
negotiations with friends and intimates. Another 
possibility is that Americans have a broader definition 
of negotiation than Arabs. 
Impressions of the Experimental Process 
Having observed the process of the experiment over 
24 trials, a number of impressions concerning the 
processes were formed by the experimenter. In some cases 
these impressions were consistent with findings discussed 
73 
above. In other cases, the impressions concerned further 
information not covered by the formal procedures of data 
collection. In some few cases those impressions were not 
completely consistent with the results of the content 
analytic procedures. Since this is an exploratory 
research project, some comments on these impressions may 
be in order. 
As was reflected in the content analysis, Arab subjects 
were more integrative than American subjects. However, 
some parts of that integrative attitude were not fully 
captured by the analysis. One striking example was the use 
of "I" and "you". American subjects, in statements which 
were both distributive and integrative, tended to be 
directive toward the other person. "You should do ••. ", 
"If you don't ••• ", "You're not being fair •.• ", and "This 
is a good deal for you ••• " were all common American 
statements. In contrast, Arab subjects used statements 
such as, "I feel we should ••• ", "I need to have .... ", and 
"I may be forced to ••. ". Due to this phrasing distributive 
statements were less confrontational. 
Other observations which seemed not to be captured 
within the framework of the content analysis scheme 
pointed to distinct style differences between Arab and 
American subjects in bargaining interactions. Body 
language was one important distinction. American subjects 
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did not use a wide variety of gestures, but, instead, 
tended to have one of two distinct postures. They either 
hunched over their chips with their elbows (and sometimes 
forearms) on the table or they reclined in their chairs 
away from the table. In contrast, Arab subjects were much 
more animated. Their postures at the table varied 
drastically. They leaned forward; they leaned back. They 
made eye contact significantly more often; frequently 
used hand gestures. While Americans sometimes played with 
their chips {frequently in what appeared to be a nervous 
gesture), Arab subjects used their chips as an extension 
of their bargaining strategies. When offers were being 
made, Arabs frequently counted out {very slowly) the number 
of chips to be offered. Those chips were sometimes then 
moved closer to the other subject to intrigue or 
tantalize him. Then, if that bid was refused, the Arab 
subject slowly moved his chips back to his part of the 
table. 
A basic attitude difference about the nature and 
purpose of bargaining between the Arab and American 
cultural groups was also observed. American subjects 
tended to either be competitive or to opt for total (or 
almost total) equity. Arab subjects seldom opted for 
total equity. They were competitive, but that 
competitiveness was couched in terms of mutual benefit. 
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They recognized that, while they were in competition, that 
the competition was about the amount of mutual gain both 
would achieve. One Arab subject was particularly adept. 
He continually reminded his Arab fellow subject that their 
goal was the same: maximum mutual benefit. In doing this, 
he very carefully phrased almost all of his statements, 
whether distributive 0£ integrative {although he used more 
integrative statements), so that there was little chance 
of outright rejection. For example, he might say, "If 
this offer is not good, what would be?" Invariably, his 
fellow subject's counter offer was a little more beneficial 
to him than the previous one. 
However, there were also similarities between the 
two groups. Whereas experimental research is often 
accused of being sterile and non-realistic, this research 
was designed so that, within the rules for exchange, 
individuals could devise their own strategies and 
interpretations. In fact, subjects from both cultures 
frequently used imagery to enliven the bargaining process. 
Chips became cars, houses, stock options, and other 
business deals. This kind of imagery was prevalent for 
both Arab and American subjects. While a particular 
definition or "story line" was usually not used 
throughout the interaction, imagery and one or more story 
lines frequently crept into the interaction. Imagery 
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was frequently used to justify or explain a particular offer 
or position. "My kids need new shoes,", 11 My boss told me 
this was as far as I can go," and "Maybe your business will 
be stronger next year," are examples of this imagery. 
Like the presence of imagery in the interaction 
fictitious side payments were introduced. The experimental 
instructions forbade any long term agreements between 
subjects. However, they did not address the issue of 
side payments. While no exchanges included real side 
payments, they were frequently a dynamic part of the 
interaction. One American subject (recruited from the 
same class as his fellow participant) offered one test 
answer for the final as part of his bid. Another American 
subject (again a classmate of his fellow participant) 
offered a date with his sister, who had been met by the 
other at a bar the previous week, as part of his Ufinal" 
offer. 
Arab subjects were not immune to the offering of side 
payments. In line with the imagery occurring at that 
point in the bargaining, one Arab subject, when told by 
his fellow subJect that he "could not afford that offer", 
then offered a low interest loan to make a deal that would 
pay off later. Another Arab subject mentioned that his 
scholarship sponsor (a multi-national corporation) would 
look kindly on acceptance by the other of his offer. 
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Finally, Arab subjects made a number of comments 
that indicated a greater familiarity with and enjoyment 
of the bargaining process than American subjects. One 
Arab subject, when recruited for the bargaining 
experiment, asked, "Is this bargaining American style 
or Egypt style?" Another Arab subject, who indicated on 
the questionnaire that there was not enough time for 
bargaining in the experiment, explained that he had spent 
one month negotiating to buy a car from a used car 
dealer in his home country. During that month, he had 
gone to the dealership daily, sometimes looking at cheaper 
cars, sometimes critically examining the car he wanted, 
and occasionally making a new bid for the car he wanted. 
Most gratifying was the subject who stated that he had 
not had a chance to do any bargaining since he left home 
and that, in its absence, he was a little homesick. 
Comments 
Detailed comments and interpretations of the results 
are found in the concluding chapter. However, some 
general observations should be mentioned at this point. 
There were no statistically significant differences in 
bargaining effectiveness between Arab and American 
subjects in the study, although there is some evidence 
that Arab subjects were slightly more effective in 
bargaining. Also clear from the data is that there were no 
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communication barriers due to cultural difference that 
proved to be a hindrance to interaction. The data also 
indicates that Arabs were more integrative than 
Americans in their bargaining style. Finally, although 
there was no real value for the chips used for 
negotiation, subjects in all conditions persistently 
and enthusiastically bargained to achieve their exchange 
outcomes. 
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Interpretations and Conclusions 
The experimental results did not support the 
hypothesis that Arab subjects would use more types of 
verbal strategies than the American subjects. In fact, 
it was found that Arab subjects, taken as a whole, showed 
greater flexibility in the use of verbal strategies 
than the American subJects. American winners and losers 
in both the Arab-American and American-American conditions 
demonstrated very similar kinds and range of use of 
verbal strategies. However, the Arab subJects who won in 
the Arab-Arab condition used a much greater range than 
the Arabs in the Arab-American condition, even though 
Arabs won in the maJority of the latter interactions. 
In that condition, Arabs showed the smallest range of 
any of the subJect groups. At least in part, this was 
due to their dominant use of integrative tactics. While 
Arab subjects were not shown to use a greater number of 
types of strategies, these comparisons imply that 
they are more flexible in choosing effective bargaining 
strategies. 
Hypothesis Two stated the greater the number of 
types of verbal strategies used, the greater the 
bargaining effectiveness. This hypothesis is partially 
upheld by the data. The data show that use of more 
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types of strategies was marginally more effective; 
however, there was only a small difference which was not 
statistically significant. This difference was small in 
part because Arab winners in the Arab-American condition, 
as pointed out earlier, did not conform to that pattern. 
Hypothesis Three was that Arab subJects are more 
effective in bargaining than American subJects. As based 
upon Hypotheses One and Two, it cannot be upheld since 
the earlier hypotheses were not. Nevertheless, the 
results indicate that Arab subJects were more effective 
in bargaining, though the difference was too small to 
be statistically significant. However, given that a 
difference in bargaining effectiveness was present, it 
is possible that a larger sample size would result in 
statistically significant differences between the Arabs 
and Americans. It can be speculated that future research 
might demonstrate greater effectiveness by Arab subjects, 
and that that effectiveness may be linked to Arabs' 
flexibility in using bargaining strategies under different 
interaction conditions, rather than in the amount of range 
in verbal strategies. 
It was also postulated in Hypothesis Four that 
there would be no significant differences in communication 
effectiveness between the same culture dyads and 
different culture dyads. The results of the research 
indicate that there was indeed little difference in 
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communication effectiveness, as measured by bargaining 
effectiveness and the incidence of communication barriers, 
between the two kinds of dyads. This held for the 
interaction in all three experimental conditions. In 
fact, communication barriers were virtually non-existent; 
a finding that is in contrast to much of the research, 
addressed below, suggesting its prevalence. 
Hypothesis Five stated that, in order to gain 
effectiveness in inter-cultural interaction similar to 
same culture interaction, a greater amount of 
communication would be necessary. The research does 
not support that hypothesis. In fact, the incidence 
of communication barriers was so slight that no extra 
time or communication was needed. 
The focus of this research has been, primarily, on 
four major issues. The first two concern whether Arabs 
are more effec~ive bargainers, and, if so, can that 
difference be examined in an American laboratory setting? 
The fact that Arab subJects could bargain at least as 
effectively (and in fact slightly more effectively) as 
Americans in a foreign environment and using a language 
not native to them, is evidence of their bargaining 
skill. 
The third issue concerned the types of verbal 
strategies which prove to be effective. Are there 
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differences in bargaining style and verbal strategies 
between Arab and American subjects? While it was not 
found that range or amount of types of strategies used 
were significantly linked to effectiveness, other points 
of interest did arise. Both distributive and integrative 
strategies were found under all three conditions--thus 
showing the existence of both cooperative and 
competitive elements in the mixed-motive bargaining game. 
Of particular significance is the strong evidence of 
Arab subjects relying on integrative strategies for 
bargaining. The integrative nature of their 
interactions with each other, and with American subjects, 
is in sharp contrast to much of the research as discussed 
below, as well as the popular view which pictures Arabs 
as confrontative, emotional and hostile. This research 
presents a markedly different view. 
Fourth, and of central concern was the issue of 
communication barriers between cultural groups, and 
whether these barriers can be overcome. The research 
has shown that communication barriers may not always be 
as prevalent as has sometimes been assumed. In any 
event, those barriers which did exist were effectively 
managed by subjects from both groups. 
It was argued for this study that the intentional 
and interactional nature of negotiation made bargaining 
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research an appropriate instrument for examining 
inter-cultural interaction. This was demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of this investigator. Both Arab and 
American subjects were able to grasp the principles of 
the bargaining game and were able to communicate 
effectively with each other. Further, the cooperative 
and competitive elements of bargaining, as discussed by 
Beisecker and others, were present, measurable, and 
generated lively interactions. That integrative 
strategies were found to be very effective in resolving 
the cooperative and competitive interests should be noted. 
Research in Arab negotiation behavior, including 
that of Patai, indicated that the tradition of the 
marketplace, with its emphasis on bargaining, and the 
strong oral tradition of Arab peoples, would lead one 
to suppose that Arabs were effective bargainers; This 
research upholds that idea. However, also present in the 
work of Patai, Trice and Mansour was the idea that Arab 
bargaining would be highly individualistic, 
competitive and confrontative. This was not shown to 
be the case. 
The anthropologist, Khuri, presented findings which 
showed Arabs as being not conflictual, but highly 
integrative in their bargaining. He indicated that, 
in addition to its economic function, bargaining served 
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to promote trust and cultivate relationships. The 
findings of this researchareconsistent with Khuri's. 
Arab subjects proved to be highly integrative, seeking 
mutual benefit while building relational ties. This 
finding is considered important by the investigator. 
Also interesting was that this type of cross-cultural 
research, inter-cultural as defined by Saral, was possible. 
Although Hepworth indicated the problems in and 
questioned the value of doing cross-cultural experimental 
studies, other scholars, such as Saral, felt that the 
direction for such research should be inter-cultural. 
That is, research, including experiments, should address 
the interaction between individuals of different cultures. 
This research suggests that this type of research is 
viable, despite cultural differences and the incidence 
of communication barriers. In fact, results of this 
research are more robust in one regard than that of 
Graham. In his Japanese-American experimental study, 
communication sometimes broke down to numerical bidding 
with very little interaction between subjects from 
different cultures. But that was not the case for this 
study. 
Hall, Watson, Condon and others have investigated 
the obstacles to communication caused by culture. Their 
concerns have informed this study. However, it has 
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been the position and a finding of this research that 
communication barriers can be recognized and managed by 
participants in interaction. While perhaps not all 
barriers can be managed and effectively overcome, this 
research has shown that they can be under general 
bargaining and negotiation conditions. 
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Appendix A 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
I. PURPOSE OF THE EXPERIMENT 
In this experiment, we are investigating certain 
properties of negotiation and exchange between 
individuals. We are interested in what goes on 
during the bargaining process and in what exchanges 
are made by individuals. We want to thank you at the 
outset for your assistance and cooperation. 
II. GENERAL NATURE OF THE EXPERIMENT 
In the first part of this experiment, you will be 
participating in a series of exchanges with one other 
participant. These exchanges will consist of 
trading counters (checker pieces) which are assigned 
certain points. You will have the opportunity to 
negotiate with the other participant, settle on the 
rate of exchange you both agree to, and then exchange 
the counters. 
This experiment will be videotaped. After analysis 
the tape will be erased. 
III. YOUR GOAL IN THE EXPERIMENT 
YOUR GOAL IS TO GET THE BEST SCORE THAT YOU CAN FOR 
YOURSELF BY ARRANGING THE EXCHANGES MOST FAVORABLE 
TO YOU. 
IV. SEQUENCE OF BARGAINING AND EXCHANGE 
The time you will spend in each episode of bargaining 
and exchange is called a "period". There will be 
3 periods in the first part of the experiment. One 
participant will be in the A position; the other 
participant in the B position. In each period, there 
will be one opportunity for bargaining and exchange. 
1. Black counters will be given to A and red counters 
to Bat the beginning of each period. 
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2a Each period will consist of one opportunity to 
negotiate and agree upon an exchange. 
3. Counters will be exchanged by A and B when a 
settlement has been reached. 
4. Counters will then be collected and the scores 
recorded. 
5. The next bargaining period will then begin with 
the distribution of counters. 
6. This procedure will continue through all 3 periods. 
V. SCORING RULES 
How chips are scored and valued varies with the A 
and B positions. 
Scoring Rules for A 
1. For each bargaining period B will receive 
ten red chips. 
2. Each chip B keeps is worth no points. 
3. Each chip received in exchange from A is 
worth one point. 
4. B must exchange all 10 chips as a block. 
REMEMBER: For B, the best exchange will be one in 
which B gets as-many of A's chips as possible in 
exchange for B's own ten-chips. 
VI. BARGAINING AND EXCHANGE RULES 
1. No exchange may occur unless mutually agreed 
upon by A and B. 
2. Transactions must be independently agreed upon 
by A and B during each period. Long term 
agreements extending beyond any one period are 
not allowed. 
3. Participants are not obligated to exchange. If 
A and B both agree that no settlement is 
possible, the period ends with no exchange. 
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General Rule in Negotiation: Bargain first, reach an 
agreement if you can, then exchange chips. 
Remember: Your goal is to score as many points as 
possible by making the best possible exchange 
agreement. 
These are instructions for the first part of the 
experiment. This part will last about half the time 
allotted for the experiment. When the 3 bargaining 
periods are completed, you will receive instructions 
for the second part of the experiment. 
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Appendix B 
Name Negotiation Session --------------
How did you feel about participating in this experiment? 
How does it compare to other situations in which you have 
bargained? 
How do you think the other person felt about being in 
the experiment? 
What was your purpose in this experiment? 
Were you satisfied with the exchanges you made? Explain. 
Would you have liked more or less time to bargain for 
the exchanges you made? 
Did the time limit for each exchange affect how you 
acted? 
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Do you think the other person was fair to you? If not, 
why not? 
Do you think you were fair to the other person? Explain. 
How do you feel about bargaining to reach a decision or 
make an exchange? (For instance, is it fun? Unpleasant?) 
Do you think you are good at bargaining? 
How do you think the other person in the experiment felt 
about bargaining? 
Was he good at bargaining? 
Name some real-life situations in which you have had to 
bargain or negotiate. 
Do you think there are times when bargaining is inappropriate 
or wrong? Give some examples. 
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Did the fact that your actions were being videotaped 




The Department of Communication Studies supports the 
practice of protection for human subjects participating in 
research. The following information is provided so that 
you can decide whether you wish to participate in the 
present study. You should be aware that even if you agree 
to participate you are free to withdraw at any time. 
The study is concerned with certain properties 
of negotiation and exchange between individuals. 
In this experiment, you will be participating in 
a series of exchanges with one other participant. 
These exchanges will consist of trading chips 
which are assigned certain points. You will have 
the opportunity to negotiate with the other 
participant, settle on the rate of exchange you 
both agree to, and then exchange the chips. 
Your participation is solicited, but strictly 
voluntary. Do not hesitate to ask any questions about 
the study. I guarantee you anonymity and confidentiality. 
Your name or identity will not be associated in any way 
with the research findings. 
Your participation in this experiment will be 
videotaped. By signing this form you will be consenting 
to be videotaped. After the completion of this study, 
the tape will be erased. 






Signature of subJect agreeing to participate 




Summary of Coding Categories 
Avoidance Acts. Acts which minimize explicit discussion 
of conflicts. 
1. Simple denial. Unelaborated statements that deny 
a conflict is present. 
2. Extended denial. Denial statements that elaborate on 
the basis of the denial. 
3. Underresponsiveness. Failure to acknowledge or deny 
the presence of a conflict following a statement or 
inquiry about the conflict by the partner. 
4. Topic shifting. Statements that terminate discussion 
of a conflict before the discussion has reached a 
natural conclusion. 
5. Topic avoidance. Statements that terminate discussion 
of a conflict issue before an opinion has been 
expressed. 
6. Abstractness. Abstract principles, generalizations, 
and hypothetical statements that supplant discussion 
of concrete individuals and events related to conflict. 
7. Semantic focus. Statements about the meaning of 
words or the appropriateness of labels that supplant 
discussion of conflict. 
8. Process focus. Procedural statements that supplant 
discussion of conflict. 
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9. Joking. Nonhostile joking that supplants serious 
discussion of conflict. 
10. Ambivalence. Shifting or contradictory statements 
about the presence of conflict. 
11. Pessimism. Pessimistic statements about conflict 
which minimize the discussion of conflict issues. 
Distributive Acts. Verbally competitive or individualistic 
acts. 
12. Faulting. Statements that directly criticize the 
personal characteristics of the partner. 
13. ReJection. Statements in response to the partner's 
previous statement that indicate personal antagonism 
toward the partner as well as disagreement. 
14. Hostile questioning. Directive or leading questions 
that fault the partner. 
15. Hostile joking. Joking or teasing that faults the 
partner. 
16. Presumptive attribution. Statements that attribute 
thoughts, feelings, intentions, or motivations to 
the partner that the partner does not acknowledge. 
17. Avoiding responsibility. Statements that minimize 
or deny personal responsibility for conflict. 
18. Prescription. Requests, demands, arguments, threats, 
or other prescriptive statements that seek a specified 
change in the partner's behavior in order to resolve 
a conflict. 
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Integrative Acts. Verbally cooperative and disclosive 
acts. 
19. Description. Nonevaluative statements about 
observable events related to conflict. 
20. Qualification. Statements that explicitly qualify 
the nature and extent of conflict. 
21. Disclosure. Nonevaluative statementsabout events 
related to conflict which the partner cannot observe, 
such as thoughts, feelings, intentions, motivations, 
and past history. 
22. Soliciting disclosure. Soliciting information from 
the partner about events related to conflict which 
one cannot observe. 
23. Negative inquiry. Soliciting complaints about 
oneself. 
24. Empathy or support. Statements that express 
understanding, acceptan9e, or positive regard for the 
partner (despite acknowledgement of a conflict). 
25. Emphasizing commonalities. Statements which comment 
on shared interests, goals, or compatibilities with 
the partner (despite acknowledgement of a conflict). 
26. Accepting responsibility. Statements that attribute 
responsibility for conflicts to self or to both 
parties. 
27. Initiating problem-solving. Statements that initiate 
mutual consideration of solutions to conflict. 
Appendix E 
Exchange Outcome Differences for Each 
Experimental Condition: Raw Data 
104 
Arab/American Arab/Arab American/American 
2 36 16 
-4 6 4 
0 6 -2 
-4 -2 1 
0 8 0 
14 4 -2 
0 6 7 
20 0 -4 
--
28 64 20 
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Appendix F 
Total Count for Verbal Strategy 
Statements for Each Experimental Condition 
Arab/American Arab/Arab American/American 
Arab American Arab Arab American American 
109 102 79 56 81 76 
64 63 59 56 73 66 
54 41 57 56 65 39 
50 32 53 35 41 38 
47 33 51 36 35 32 
28 25 47 45 26 21 
15 16 34 33 14 9 
15 13 30 15 11 7 
382 325 410 332 346 288 
I I 










I 71% 29% l 







I 63% 25% 







Would you have liked more or less time to bargain for the 
exchanges you made? 
Arab 
more same less more 
117% I 46% 29% 8% 














Do you think you were fair to the other person? 
Arab American 
yes no yes no 
67% 33% 63% I 37% 
Do you think you are good at bargaining? 
Arab American 
yes no yes no 
83% 17% 46% 54% 
Was the other participant good at bargaining? 
Arab American 
yes no yes no 
58% 42% 67% 33% 
